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Airbnb and Taxation: Developing A Seasonal Tax System 
 
Abstract 
This study applies tax planning theory to develop a seasonal tax strategy as an alternative to a 
fixed tax rate for shared lodging platforms such as Airbnb, to increase hosts’ revenue and address 
seasonality in tourism. The annual revenue of the various types of accommodation is used to 
calculate a seasonality index by the moving average method, which is incorporated as a corrected 
coefficient in a seasonal tax formula. The sample includes data from 1,258 active Airbnb listings 
in Boston, Massachusetts. Using a mean comparison test, this study reveals that the application 
of a seasonal tax strategy significantly increases the revenue of Airbnb hosts compared to a fixed 
tax rate system. Drawing on the flexibility tenet of tax planning theory, policy makers can use 
the proposed seasonal tax strategy as an instrument to revisit the taxation system for sharing 
economy businesses based on changes to the socioeconomic, environmental, and political 
conditions. Implications for all stakeholders are discussed.  





An emerging economy of new Internet-based marketplaces where people can share their goods 
and services has been flourishing around the world in recent years. Airbnb, Uber, and Lyft are 
examples of these kinds of collaborative consumption systems. Airbnb is one of the most 
prominent members of the shared accommodation business and operates more than six million 
listings worldwide (Airbnb press room, 2019). It has been estimated that Airbnb’s annual 
revenue will exceed $10 billion by 2020 (Heo et al., 2019). 
Like other businesses in the travel and tourism industry, Airbnb’s operation is subject to 
seasonality, which can cause overtourism and fluctuation in revenue (Costa et al., 2018; 
Goodwin, 2017). Seasonality derives not only from the natural seasons (e.g., summer and winter) 
but also from commercial and religious seasons (e.g. Christmas and Easter holidays) that affect 
tourists’ decision making and thus the revenue of tourism and hospitality services (Rosselló and 
Sansó, 2017). The efficiency of tourism services can be decreased when large masses of tourists 
are concentrated at a destination during a brief ‘peak’ season and little tourist activity occurs 
during the rest of the year (Lim and McAleer, 2001). Overtourism and revenue instability 
influence local communities’ perceptions and attitudes toward the tourism industry (Matev and 
Assenova, 2012; Weber et al., 2017).  
Tourism research typically focuses on analysis of the distribution of imbalances of a 
specific feature (e.g., number of Airbnb guests) during a span of time to predict the future 
patterns of the given feature. For instance, Merkert and Webber (2018) report a remarkable 
seasonal fluctuation in both the seat factor of the average flight and the price of tickets, which 
demonstrates the impact of seasonality on commercial airlines. Different time-series methods 
have been used to measure the impacts of seasonality. For example, in several studies (e.g., 
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Ferrante et al., 2018; Koenig-Lewis and Bischoff, 2005; Lim and McAleer, 2001; Yang and 
Zhang, 2019) seasonal changes in the number of tourist arrivals and aggregate demand for 
tourism are measured through moving average techniques. Although some research (e.g., Cetin 
et al., 2017; Gudkov et al., 2017; Mills et al.,2019; Sheng, 2017) evaluated the effectiveness of 
different types of tax system in the development of the tourism industry, no studies appear to 
have applied a moving average method to modelling seasonal tax in peer-to-peer 
accommodations (i.e., Airbnb).  
To address this research gap, the present study uses a moving average technique to 
examine the seasonal revenue pattern of Airbnb hosts in Boston, Massachusetts. We develop a 
seasonal index that is incorporated into the common tax formula. By correcting the tax 
coefficient based on seasonal revenue patterns, both hosts and guests will pay less tax in low 
seasons, which results in lower prices and redistribution of tourist flows throughout the year, as 
well as more sustainable revenue for hosts. Hence, this study can be used as a guideline by both 
Airbnb hosts and policy makers worldwide to employ a seasonal tax, as an adaptive strategy to 
seasonality and overtourism.  
Theoretical background 
Airbnb benefits and challenges  
Airbnb is a privately owned rental website that provides a peer-to-peer platform for individuals 
to rent rooms, flats, apartments, villas, and other temporary accommodations at a wide range of 
prices. However, there is criticism of the commercial use of Airbnb by property owners and 
landlords, which may affect local housing markets unfavorably through increasing rental fees 
(Schäfer and Braun, 2016; Wachsmuth and Weiser, 2018). Therefore, commercial practices (i.e., 
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permanently rented entire units) should be considered in addition to home sharing to fully 
understand the platform’s role in the accommodation sector (Kadi et al., 2019). 
Airbnb lists more than six million places for people to stay in more than 100,000 cities 
and 191 countries around the world (Airbnb, 2019a). Airbnb is valued at US$38 billion as of 
2018, a significant increase relative to 2017 (US$31 billion) (Lock, 2019). Airbnb hosts share 
unoccupied rooms and properties with travellers to generate income. In return, guests benefit 
from cheaper accommodations, a greater degree of choice, lower commission fees (20 percent to 
30 percent), and greater flexibility with regards to reservation scheduling (Zekanovic-Korona 
and Grzunov, 2014).  
In comparing Airbnb to hotels, the average nightly rate for Airbnb lodging in Boston was 
24.5 percent less than the average nightly rate for a hotel room in 2015. Moreover, tourists who 
stay in Airbnb accommodations appreciate the opportunity to experience the local culture by 
staying in a place like home, living like a local, and participating in local events and activities 
(Malazizi et al., 2018). Social integration, economic gains, and enjoyment of the local activities 
are among the individuals’ motivation to use digital sharing economy platforms (Hamari et al., 
2016).  
Airbnb’s benefits are not limited to the hosts and guests; local communities and 
governmental bodies can appreciate different functions of this sharing platform (Hong and Lee, 
2018; Zervas et al., 2017). For example, the South Korean government implemented a tax-free 
policy for peer-to-peer accommodation platforms (including Airbnb) during the 2018 Winter 
Olympics to furnish accommodations for 1.57 million visitors. Airbnb has a considerable 
economic impact on local communities; research suggests local economic booms caused by 
guests’ daytime spending at local businesses (Kaplan and Nadler, 2015). In addition to the social 
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and economic impacts of Airbnb, home sharing has environmental benefits as well. Comparing 
the environmental impacts of Airbnb lodgings and hotels in North America and Europe, Airbnb 
claims it provides more environmentally sustainable accommodations (Airbnb, 2014). Airbnb 
properties tend to be associated with less waste and energy and water usage per guest than hotels, 
which corresponds to lower greenhouse gas emissions (Airbnb, 2014; Midgett et al., 2018).  
The degree to which Airbnb potentially threatens the hotel industry is the subject of 
scholarly debate. Zervas et al. (2017) articulated that as hotels must comply with various 
regulations and obligations, such as obtaining permissions for zoning codes and fire codes, 
insurance requirements, safety inspections, and city and state occupancy taxes, Airbnb has 
comparative advantages. They argued that the fast-growing number of Airbnb listings and guests 
negatively affected hotel revenues in Texas. Another study found that Airbnb mitigates premium 
prices at hotels and decreases in hotels’ average daily room rates during peak seasons (Lane and 
Woodworth, 2016). Dogru et al. (2019) also showed that growth in Airbnb supply negatively 
influenced performance metrics (i.e., room revenues, average daily rates, and occupancy rates) of 
ten major U.S. hotel markets. In contrast, Choi et al. (2015) and Haywood et al. (2017) 
contended that Airbnb growth does not affect the hotel industry. Having said that, current and 
future impacts of Airbnb as an extremely flexible and dynamic accommodation provider cannot 
be neglected (Dogru et al., 2017; Haywood et al., 2017).  
Airbnb hosts can make thousands of beds available throughout the world without 
extensive planning, permits, and, in some cases, taxes (García-Hernández et al., 2017; Goodwin, 
2017). Hence, the flexibility of Airbnb’s peer-to-peer structure allows users of the platform to 
respond well to the seasonal changes of demand pattern (e.g., raising rates during popular events 
and summer and winter holidays). Unlike Airbnb hosts, who normally do not have to deal with 
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the complicated process and legal costs of running a business, hoteliers must pay higher capital 
and fixed costs, such as wages to employees, employees’ health premiums, marketing 
communications, and yearly maintenance fees that are not related to the number of guests or 
sales revenue (Zervas et al., 2017).  
As discussed earlier, hotels have more limited power to quickly change prices and 
reallocate resources during periods of peak demand (Zervas et al., 2017). However, the potential 
impacts of Airbnb lodgings on local hotels’ revenue differ based on their geographical proximity, 
relative service quality, and price (Zervas et al., 2017). Nonetheless, a precise comparison is 
difficult, as hotels’ revenue can be affected by numerous factors. For example, the number of 
guests in certain hotels depends heavily on the season as well as the factors noted above. In 
addition to seasonal changes in the weather, various social and cultural holidays can affect the 
number of visitors to a given destination. These imbalances, called seasonality by Butler (1994), 
can influence the number of tourists, the types of tourists, and the money spent by tourists at that 
destination. 
Airbnb and taxation 
Airbnb has grown rapidly in recent years. However, the platform currently faces headwinds from 
some landlords’ coalitions and hotel industry insiders, who criticise Airbnb for its ability to 
circumvent the established rules and regulations (Zervas et al., 2017). Uzunca and Borlenghi 
(2019) indicate that more rules and a legitimate legal framework would increase the short-term 
accommodation supply by decreasing the uncertainties surrounding the legal issues in digital 
sharing economy platforms. With this realisation, Airbnb has begun to notify all its users about 
relevant regulations and legislations in the area they operate. Airbnb services are available in 
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hundreds of countries and cities and Airbnb should work collaboratively with local authorities 
and hosts to provide detailed legal guidance to hosts using its platform (Kaplan, 2014).  
Taxation is one of the regulatory approaches that policy makers apply to digital platform 
businesses (Davidson and Infranca, 2016; Ranchordás, 2015). In light of the lower costs 
associated with the emergent peer-to-peer lodging sector, two general taxation schemes are 
proposed for platforms like Airbnb (Airbnb, 2019b). The first is levying a service fee on both 
guests and hosts. Airbnb earns 9 percent to 12 percent from guests for each reservation—the 
precise rate varies based on the length of stay—and 3 percent from hosts. Alternatively, 
governments can also impose a local tax on the service. For example, Airbnb hosts’ revenue in 
some U.S. localities can be subject to income taxes. Airbnb reports information on U.S. hosts 
whose gross income is more than $20,000 and whose transactions per year total more than 200 to 
the Internal Revenue Service (Airbnb, 2019b). Airbnb currently collects taxes from hosts in 
certain cities. For instance, hosts collectively pay more than $20 million in occupancy tax in 
New York City. Airbnb also has agreed to collect lodging taxes from users in Portland (Njus, 
2014).  
According to tax information provided by the Massachusetts Department of Revenue 
(DOR, 2017), Airbnb, hotels, lodging houses, and motels must pay a room occupancy excise tax 
of 5.7 percent for any rented room with a rate of more than $15 per night. Cities and towns in 
Massachusetts impose additional local room occupancy excise taxes. For example, this excise tax 
is 6.5 percent in Boston. A tax rate of 2.75 percent is also levied to provide convention centre 
funding in the cities of Boston, Worcester, Cambridge, Springfield, West Springfield, and 
Chicopee. Thus, Airbnb hosts in these cities must pay a total of 14.95 percent tax for each room 
rented for more than $15 per night. In sum, Airbnb hosts can face significant liability when a 
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fixed-rate tax is levied on their income. Although authorities already monitor and track Airbnb 
members’ financial activities by imposing a service fee or fixed-rate income tax in some 
localities, a more flexible taxation system can aid governments to regulate and exercise oversight 
over Airbnb hosts. Hosts also stand to benefit if the taxation system ensures sustainability of 
their revenues.  
Seasonality in tourism  
Tackling the challenges of seasonality is an important and under-researched topic in tourism 
scholarship (Baron, 1975; Commons and Page, 2001). Seasonality is defined in relation to 
tourism as “the tendency of tourist flows to become concentrated into relatively short periods of 
the year” (Allcock, 1989, 387). Bowie et al. (2016: 6) noted that “irregular demand can be 
described in hospitality markets as the seasonality of demand”. The literature provides evidence 
that the behaviour of tourists is affected significantly by climate and weather (Li et al., 2017a, 
2017b; Olya and Alipour, 2015; Olya et al., 2019; Ridderstaat et al., 2014).  
Overtourism caused by seasonality has negative impacts on the experiences of tourists 
(Ashworth and Thomas, 1999; Lundmark, 2006; Yacoumis, 1980). Butler (1994: 332) stated that 
seasonality is “a temporal imbalance in the phenomenon of tourism, which may be expressed in 
terms of the number of visitors, traffic on the highways, employment and admission to 
attractions”. Because tourism and hospitality fields are significantly affected by seasonality, 
seasonality is often considered in economic and financial assessments of these fields. Scott and 
McBoyle (2007) argue that seasonality can hamper the overall ability of the tourism industry to 
generate sustainable revenue. The overuse and underuse of facilities occurring in peak and off 
seasons, respectively, may also result in inefficiencies in service operations (Getz and Nilsson, 
2004; Pegg et al., 2012) and economic development (Williams and Shaw, 1991).  
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Airbnb is regarded as one of the stimulators of overtourism at a given destination. The 
affordability and availability of Airbnb attract more people to a destination who are interested in 
renting accommodation using Airbnb (García-Hernández et al., 2017; Goodwin, 2017). 
Seasonality causes various complications in tourism planning and management, especially in 
fragile natural environments exposed to high tourist traffic in peak seasons (Li and Srinivasan, 
2019; Weaver and Oppermann, 2000). Water and air pollution, traffic congestion, safety and 
security issues, and negative effects on residents’ well-being are a few burdens that large 
numbers of tourists can place on local communities during relatively short periods of peak traffic 
like holidays (Cuccia and Rizzo, 2011; Martín-Martín et al., 2014; Sastre et al., 2015). In sum, 
problems stemming from seasonality affect both the local environment and residents’ daily lives 
(Deery et al., 2012). 
Seasonality is such an important yet under-researched issue in tourism and hospitality 
management that both the private and public sectors are seeking adaptive strategies to tackle the 
problems it can cause (Vergori, 2017). In this vein, Li and Srinivasan (2019) proposed supply- 
and demand-side strategies such as distribution of the demand between off seasons and peak 
seasons and redistribution of the supply from a peak season to a low season. Marketing and 
promotional practices such as pricing and tax inducement, service personalisation, and 
diversification of products and services have been suggested to encourage tourists to travel 
during off seasons (Connell et al., 2015; Rotaris and Carrozzo, 2019).  
In line with ecological modernisation theory, Olya (2015) proposed a nature-based 
solution to develop a recreation management calendar that helps decentralisation of tourism 
activities on a Mediterranean island and redistributions of tourism flows throughout the year. A 
seasonal tax system may offer positive economic, environmental, and social benefits to a 
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destination by taking seasonality into account to create a tax plan. A seasonal tax system as a 
sustainable policy could result in redistributing tourism flows throughout the year, which is 
particularly important in fragile destinations. 
Theory of tax planning 
There are several theories such as the theory of tax planning (Hoffman, 1961) and the theory of 
tax reform (Feldstein, 1976) that explain why tax reform is imperative. The theory of tax 
planning postulates that improper management of a tax system may have a negative impact on 
individual taxpayers (Hoffman, 1961). This study uses the theory of tax planning as a core theory 
to support the development of a seasonal tax system. According to the first tenet of the theory of 
tax planning, the concept of flexibility should also be embodied in the original tax plan. It states 
that a tax plan should be able to “be modified in accordance with changes in the tax laws, 
business conditions, or the motivations of the taxpayer” (Hoffman, 1961, 280). Not only the 
basic plan may need modification, but also possible alternatives should be incorporated. 
Although a service fee or fixed-rate income tax is applied to Airbnb in many places, a more 
flexible taxation system considering the seasonal pattern of the hosts’ revenue would aid 
governments to regulate Airbnb properly.  
Policy makers normally consider the utility of consumers (e.g., hosts and tourists) and 
negative externalities of seasonality (i.e., social and environmental costs) in planning to mitigate 
seasonality (Cellini and Rizzo, 2012). Distributing tourists throughout a year and tackling 
seasonality can favourably affect congestion and underutilisation of capacity, which lead to 
enhancement of the quality of tourist experiences as well as the well-being of citizens (Connell et 
al., 2015). The actions also provide peace of mind to all stakeholders that the tax system is 
flexible enough to incorporate social, political, economic, and environmental conditions in 
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sharing economy businesses and services. From the host perspective, because the number of idle 
rooms in off seasons will be decreased the alternative tax plan provides an incentive for 
sustainable revenue over a year. 
Methodology 
This study examines 1,258 active Airbnb listings in Boston, Massachusetts, between April 2015 
and March 2016. We used listing data from AirDNA that provides short-term vacation rental 
data and analytics related to more than 10 million listings in 80,000 markets globally. The 
classification includes shared room, private room, studio, one room, two rooms, three rooms, and 
4 or more rooms. The monthly revenue of each lodging is used to calculate a seasonal index 
through the moving average approach (Formulas 1 and 2). The seasonal index is then applied to 
modify the common fixed tax rate (Formula 3). Afterwards, a seasonal tax rate is computed for 
Airbnb hosts by multiplying the modified fixed tax rate by the seasonal tax coefficient (Formula 
4). Next, two sets of revenue are calculated by deducting the fixed tax rate and the modified tax 
rate from the total revenue. A means comparison test (i.e., t-test) is used to compare host 
revenues with and without the seasonal tax strategy. These procedures are explained in detail 
below.  
The moving average technique shows the trend and recurrent components of series 
(Barrow, 2016). One assumption is that the seasonal patterns remain constant year to year. 
Following Lim and McAleer (2001), the first step is to calculate the four centred moving 
averages using Formula 1. 
𝑀𝐴 = × [𝑌 + 2 × ∑ 𝑌 + 𝑌 ]   (Formula 1) 
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where 𝑀𝐴  is the centred moving average of the hosts’ revenue for season 𝑡; 
𝑌  is the revenue in season 𝑡; 
k is the number of lags. 
The centred moving average of Airbnb hosts’ revenue in Boston is calculated for data 
obtained for the period 2015 (April)–2016 (March). According to Airbnb listings’ categories, 
data include shared rooms, private rooms, and ‘entire place’ lodgings (studios and one- to four-
bedroom apartments). Generally, the average revenue of the hosts displays seasonal patterns. 
Revenue rises slowly to its highest point in October ($6,193) but decreases dramatically to about 
$2,800 in February and begins to rise again in March. However, average revenue drops 19 
percent in September, defying this broader trend (Figure 1). 
Insert Figure 1 here 
The next step is calculation of the ratio to the moving average (𝑃 ), which is obtained by dividing 
revenue by the corresponding moving average for each season and expressing it in percentage 
form (Formula 2). 
𝑃 = × 100%  (Formula 2) 
The ratios eliminate the trend and cyclical components, which results in a series that 
contains seasonal and irregular movements. These percentages need to be arranged according to 
the seasons of the given years. Then, the averages over all seasons of the given years are 




The seasonal indices estimated for hosts’ average revenue in various Airbnb listings are shown in 
Table 1. The seasonal indices for spring and summer are nearly identical, with values of 1.23 and 
1.21, respectively. 
Insert Table 1 here 
Finally, an appropriate seasonal tax rate for an Airbnb establishment can be defined by finding 
the modified tax rate by applying the seasonality index.  
𝐶𝑇 = −    (Formula 3) 
where CT is the modified tax rate; 
𝑃    is the ratio to the moving average for each season; 
𝑇   is the fixed tax rate of 14.95 percent. 
𝑇 = 𝐶𝑇 × 𝑌    (Formula 4) 
where 𝑇  is the seasonal tax.  
To calculate the revenue (Ys) after seasonal tax, the seasonal tax (Ts) is deducted from the 
original revenue (Yt). The amount of total taxes and host revenues with and without the seasonal 
tax are calculated and presented in Table 2. It is assumed that a moving average method 
satisfactorily expresses the trend and cyclical components of the series. The seasonal structure 
remains constant from year to year, which means the peaks and troughs generally occur in the 
same intra-year periods. The results show that hosts would pay less tax ($4,035) and earn higher 
revenue when paying the seasonal tax rate instead of the fixed tax rate during the year 2015–
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2016. However, an inferential statistical analysis is needed to test whether there is a significant 
difference between the revenue before and after applying the seasonal tax rate.  
Insert Table 2 here  
Table 3 presents the results of a t-test to compare the mean of revenues with and without 
applying the seasonal tax rate. The results reveal that revenues with and without the seasonal tax 
are significantly different (mean difference: −48.046, p < 0.001) such that the mean of host 
revenue when incorporating the seasonal tax (Ys: 4083.696) is more than the mean of host 
revenue with the fixed tax rate (Yf: 4035.650). This significant difference indicates the 
functionality of a seasonal tax strategy as a policy that could potentially increase the revenue of 
Airbnb hosts. 
Insert Table 3 here 
Conclusion and implications 
Tourism and hospitality services, including peer-to-peer platforms such as Airbnb, are affected 
by seasonality. The main economic impacts of seasonality on both supply and demand sides 
include higher rent prices, instability of job positions, and variation in service quality. Often, the 
overall effect is not favourable and one possible solution against this challenge is proposing 
sustainable revenue management strategies. Airbnb hosts’ revenue management to address 
seasonality is important due to the size of Airbnb as a fast-growing business. In particular, 
research on seasonality in Airbnb is important as it is recognised as one of the contributors to 
overtourism because of its social and economic benefits (García-Hernández et al., 2017; 
Goodwin, 2017). As Zervas et al. (2017) discussed there are debates on the lack of an 
appropriate legal framework for peer-to-peer accommodations. Drawing on the theory of tax 
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planning, this study contributed to the current knowledge of seasonality and the sharing economy 
by proposing an alternative strategy to reform the current tax system which improves sustainable 
revenue management of Airbnb hosts.    
Although a fixed tax rate is currently applied to host revenue in some areas such as 
Boston, a seasonal tax as a flexible approach could be beneficial to governments, hosts, and even 
tourists. It acts as an instrument for managing host revenues sustainably as well as forecasting 
and expanding off-season tourism or tackling seasonality in a destination. The results from a t-
test show that integration of seasonality in tax planning, compared to a fixed tax rate, helps hosts 
to pay less tax and earn a higher revenue in a one-year period. In accordance with Hamari et al. 
(2016), who believed that financial benefits make Airbnb a popular platform, improving host 
revenues through a seasonal tax system encourages Airbnb hosts to use and recommend this 
digital sharing economy platform as a serious source of income. On the other hand, less 
congestion at tourist attractions and higher service quality will also enhance tourist experiences.   
Lower tax payments and higher revenue of hosts mean that local government tax revenue 
decreases and calculation costs of the modified amount of taxes may be added to the tax 
equation. Nonetheless, in line with Connell et al. (2015), government can compromise on costs 
involved in the seasonal tax as it acts as an adaptive strategy against seasonality and helps fulfil 
their commitments and responsibilities concerning the climate change crisis. As Connell et al. 
(2015) argued, it can improve the social well-being of local communities. According to the 
flexibility tenet of the theory of tax planning (Hoffman, 1961), this policy provides an 
opportunity for local authorities to create an expectation for the hosts in terms of the possibility 
of modifying the taxation system according to environmental, economic, social, and political 
16 
 
conditions. Specifically, small changes in the taxation system in countries like the United States 
may have huge impacts.  
Other applications of a seasonal tax as a helpful strategy for sustainable tourism 
management include the management of lodging for mega-events (e.g., the Olympics) and 
conservation of historical and ecological tourist attractions from damage caused by overtourism. 
As Olya (2015) discussed, by redistributing tourism flows throughout the year, a seasonal tax can 
serve as a nature-based solution that decreases the impact of tourism on fragile sites (such as 
historical landmarks and natural environments) that can be damaged by overuse during peak 
demand periods. Governmental bodies can support such adaptive strategies not only to raise 
public awareness about the impact of seasonality and climate change but also to demonstrate 
they are supporting businesses and services through applying such solutions to economic and 
ecological challenges.  
This study is subject to some limitations that offer opportunities for future research. This 
study is a first attempt to propose an adaptive strategy against seasonality by developing a 
seasonal tax system. We used the available data on Airbnb listings in Boston during a specific 
period (2015–2016). We encourage future research to use multisource data from a wider time 
span. Moreover, in the present study, we discussed the revenue management of Airbnb hosts in 
addressing seasonality; further study can investigate revenue management of Airbnb and local 
authorities with integration of the proposed seasonal tax strategy. Another pathway for future 
research is designing the architecture of operationalisation of a seasonal tax system that 
demonstrates details of the calculation cost of the modified tax, required resources, and 
coordination and cooperation between stakeholders (e.g., local authorities, hosts, and Airbnb) to 
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Table 1. Seasonal indices for revenue series 2015-2016 









Table 2. Total tax and host revenue with and without seasonal tax 
Airbnb category Season Yt T Yf Ts Ys 
Shared Room S1 (April-June) 4160.000 622.336 3537.664 588.099 3571.901 
S2 (July-September) 6427.000 961.479 5465.521 907.721 5519.279 
S3 (October- December) 4300.000 643.280 3656.720 595.072 3704.928 
S4 (January-Mach) 4237.000 633.855 3603.145 569.235 3667.765 
Private Room S1 (April-June) 7815.000 1168.343 6646.658 1104.806 6710.194 
S2 (July-September) 8812.000 1317.394 7494.606 1244.568 7567.432 
S3 (October- December) 7042.000 1052.779 5989.221 974.535 6067.465 
S4 (January-Mach) 5546.000 829.127 4716.873 745.097 4800.903 
Studio S1 (April-June) 11789.000 1762.456 10026.545 1666.610 10122.390 
S2 (July-September) 12925.000 1932.288 10992.713 1825.469 11099.531 
S3 (October- December) 10495.000 1569.003 8925.998 1452.391 9042.609 
S4 (January-Mach) 8319.000 1243.691 7075.310 1117.645 7201.355 
B1 S1 (April-June) 14660.000 2191.670 12468.330 2072.483 12587.517 
S2 (July-September) 16067.000 2402.017 13664.984 2269.231 13797.769 
S3 (October- December) 12230.000 1828.385 10401.615 1692.496 10537.504 
S4 (January-Mach) 9184.000 1373.008 7810.992 1233.856 7950.144 
B2 S1 (April-June) 20318.000 3037.541 17280.459 2872.354 17445.646 
S2 (July-September) 21519.000 3217.091 18301.910 3039.248 18479.752 
S3 (October- December) 14967.000 2237.567 12729.434 2071.267 12895.734 
S4 (January-Mach) 11204.000 1674.998 9529.002 1505.240 9698.760 
B3 S1 (April-June) 22474.000 3359.863 19114.137 3177.148 19296.852 
S2 (July-September) 19949.000 2982.376 16966.625 2817.508 17131.492 
S3 (October- December) 19642.000 2936.479 16705.521 2718.235 16923.765 
S4 (January-Mach) 15656.000 2340.572 13315.428 2103.360 13552.640 
B4 S1 (April-June) 32783.000 4901.059 27881.942 4634.530 28148.470 
S2 (July-September) 31595.000 4723.453 26871.548 4462.337 27132.663 
S3 (October- December) 29562.000 4419.519 25142.481 4091.052 25470.948 
S4 (January-Mach) 14908.000 2228.746 12679.254 2002.867 12905.133 
Note: Yt: original revenue, T: total tax with fixed rate, Yf: after-fixed tax revenue, Ts: total tax with seasonal 




Table 3. Results of t-test for comparing hosts’ revenue with and without seasonal tax 
Revenue Means   Paired differences  
t value Yf Ys  Mean difference (Yf-Ys) Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean  
4035.650 4083.696  -48.046*** 27.318 2.980  -16.119 
Note: ***: p<0.001(2-tailed), Yf: after-fixed tax revenue, Ys: after-seasonal tax revenue. 
 
